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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY MYERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
9937 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant appeals from a conviction for the crime 
of rape committed upon his ten year old daughter in vio-
lation of 76-53-15 ( 1), U. C. A. 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried for the crime of rape in the 
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of 
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Utah. He was convicted upon jury trial, and has appealed 
from that conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent contends the conviction should be af-
firmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts: 
The appellant, Larry Myers, during October, 1962, re-
sided with his daughter, Sherry, age 10 (R. 52, 117) and 
her two brothers in Ogden, Utah (R. 52). His daughter 
had previously that year resided with her aunt, but when 
school started, left and resided with her father and a 
woman named Theo, who shortly thereafter left the home 
(R. 54). After the woman, Theo, left, the appellant, Sher-
ry's father, had sexual intercourse with her on several 
occasions. She testified ( R. 54) : 
"Q. All right, now after Theo left and left 
with her children, where did you sleep then? 
"A. Four or five days after she left, I slept 
in my father's bedroom with him. 
"* * * 
"A. Well, my; the first time it happened I was 
in my bedroom and my brothers had already gone 
to bed and I was in on my bed and getting the cov .. 
ers down and I was in the bed and my father came 
in and told me to come in his bedroom and I said, 
'no,' and I just kept on saying 'no,' and he finally 
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got up and he told me to, and I came, just, I'm 
scared of my father and I didn't want him to hit 
me so I did. 
"Q. Now, tell us what happened then when 
you went into your father's bedroom. 
"A. I went in my father's bedroom and he 
locked the door and told me to take off my clothes 
and I did, and then he told me to lay down on the 
bed, and I did, and he took off all his clothes and 
then he laid on top of me and put his, took some 
Jergens lotion and put it inside of me and then he 
put some on his thing and then he laid down and 
he put it in me and started to go up and down." 
Approximately four to five days later he again had sexual 
intercourse with his daughter (R. 57), and about ten days 
thereafter a third experience occurred ( R. 58) . On Octo-
ber 19, 1962, the Friday before deer season, the appellant 
again forced himself on his daughter (R. 59). She testi-
fied: 
"* * * I was just going to bed and my 
father was making the rounds turning the lights 
off when I was in bed. My father came in and he 
told me to go get in his bed, so he just kept on say-
ing that, so I got up and I went over and I went 
in his bedroom and he locked the door, and he 
locked the door, and he stood up and took off his 
shorts and he laid me down and he put some J er-
gens lotion inside of me and then he put some on 
him, and then he laid down on top of me and he put 
his thing in me and started to go up and down 
again, and when he was doing this, when he was 
through, when he was through he told me. we were 
just talking and he told me it isn't very nice. but 
he told me, he said, 'your grandma is going to die.' 
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"Q. Is that what he said? 
"A. That is his exact words. 
"Q. Now, while he was going up and down, 
did you do anything to stop him? 
"A. Yes, I jerked it out once and he hit me 
in the forehead right here (indicating). 
"Q. What did he hit you with? 
''A. His hand, his fist. 
"Q. And then what did he do? 
"A. Then he put it back in and he started to 
go up and down again. 
"Q. And then after that what did you do? 
"A. When he was all through I was all wet 
and I was bleeding and I went and sat on the toilet 
again, and I put my pants on and my pajamas on 
and he told me to lay down in his bed, so I did. I 
stayed there until in the morning and it was real 
early, they went deer hunting; they went up to the 
Carters, and my father was,-." 
On October 29, 1962, Sherry was examined by a pedia-
trician, Doctor Homer R. Rich. who testified as to Sherry's 
condition ( R. 107) : 
"A. She was chronolgically ten years of age, 
according to my records and her maturity was that 
of an average ten year old girl. which is prepubes-
cent, that is, she is still an infant as regards her 
sexual development, there is no axillary hair, no 
pubic hair, and no beginning maturation or secon-
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dary sexual development as evidence by pubic hair 
or enlargement of the labia or other parts of the 
external genitalia. In other words, she was infan-
tile. 
"* • *" 
(R. 108): 
''A. This child was unusal in that, first of all, 
a glove finger could be inserted into the vaginal 
canal which would be absolutely impossible under 
normal circumstances, and there was marked red-
ness, irritation, inflammation of the internal intro-
itus which includes the inner parts of the vulva and 
the vaginal canal. 
"Q. Now, when you say introitus, you mean 
by that the entrance to the vagina? 
"A. Entrance to the vagina, that is correct. 
''Q. What about within the vaginal canal or 
inside of this little girl? 
"A. Normally the hymen is seen, maybe four 
or five millimeters from the beginning of the labia 
minora which is the small lips of the female geni-
talia, the hymen, the shreds of it could be seen torn, 
red and inflamed, and as the labia were separated 
I could look into the vaginal canal which I have 
never been able to look into in a child of this age 
in my practice. 
"* * *" 
(R. 109) : 
"A. Well, marked redness inflammation of the 
entire structure into the vaginal canal and also of 
the labia majora and minora, in other words, the 
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entire external genitalia or the lower portion of the 
vaginal area was inflamed and irritated." 
Although Sherry admitted being kicked in her private 
parts which induced bleeding (R. 66) the Doctor testified 
in his opinion that neither masturbation or a kick could 
cause the damage he observed (R. 110-113). He testified 
penetration could have caused the damage (R. 110). 
At the time the appellant was being booked on the 
charge, he stated to the officer. "Can't you make that a 
lesser charge, like molesting instead of rape?" (R. 95). 
The appellant offered evidence that he had been a 
good father, that the child the day after the incident of 
October 19, 1962, had appeared friendly and loving to him 
and made no complaint to friends; that the child had prev-
iously in her life indicated malice towards her father, and 
that no fresh complaint was made. 
Based on the above evidence the jury convicted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT DENY THE ACCUSED 
A FAIR TRIAL SINCE 
A. NO EXCLUSION OF ANY PERSONS WAS 
MADE EXCEPT DURING THE OPENING 
ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTION, 
AND THAT WAS LIMITED TO WITNES-
SES. 
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B. APPELLANT'S RELATIVES AND MEM-
BERS OF THE PRESS WERE PRESENT 
DURING THE TRIAL. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S ACTIONS WERE 
NOT OTHERWISE PREJUDICIAL. 
The appellant, in his brief, argues that the trial court 
committed error by excluding the witnesses from the court-
room and thus denied the accused a public trial. The issue 
is not appropos to the facts of record. After the jury was 
sworn, the Assistant District Attorney made a motion to 
exclude spectators from the courtroom (R. 22). The prose-
cution obviously based its motion on 78-7-4, U. C. A. 1953. 
which provides : 
"In an action of divorce, criminal conversation, 
seduction, abortion, rape, or assault with intent to 
commit rape, the court may, in its discretion, ex-
clude all persons who are not directly interested 
therein, except jurors, witnesses and officers of the 
court; and in any cause the court may, in its discre-
tion, during the examination of a ~vitness exclude 
any and all other witnesses in the cause.'~ 
The trial judge refused to exclude spectators, but said, 
(R. 23) : 
"THE COURT: To the extent only. I will 
grant it only as to the witnesses. If you want that, 
you can have that. If you don't want it, they can 
come back. 
"MR. NEWEY: We do desire that, Your Honor. 
"THE COURT: All right, you may proceed." 
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The defense counsel did not, at that time, object to the 
limited exclusion, although he had previously objected on 
the grounds that exclusion of witnesses was not what the 
prosecution had requested (R. 23). Thereafter, the prose-
cution, in the absence of witnesses, made its opening ad-
dress to the jury. Other persons were present, including 
members of the press (R. 4, 22, 23). Subsequently, the 
defense counsel made his previous objection more specific 
(R. 31) and argument out of the presence of the jury was 
had (R. 31-34). Thereafter, before any evidence was pre-
sented, the prosecution withdrew its motion (R. 35). Again 
argument was had (R. 35-38). The trial judge finally 
ruled that the trial would be held in open court with all 
persons, including witnesses, being present (R. 39) : 
"THE COURT: Let the record show the an-
nouncement in the courtroom is that the trial will 
be public. Let anybody in and out that wants to 
come in and out. Proceed." 
Thereafter, the first witness was called and the trial 
proceeded as a public trial. The appellant's mother and 
grandmother were present during the trial as were other 
spectators and friends (R. 195). The appellant's conten-
tion, therefore, that he was denied a "public trial" is not 
in accord with the facts. The trial, as such, was conducted 
as an open public trial, except that potential witnesses were 
excluded during the prosecution's opening argument only. 
Therefore, what appellant has argued in his brief is not 
appropos to the facts. 
The only issue is, did what actually transpired, to wit: 
the exclusion of prospective witnesses only, during the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
prosecution's opening address, violate any rights of the 
appellant? The issue has not been directly passed on in this 
state. 78-7-·1, U. C. A. 1953. as noted above, provides in its 
relevant part: 
"* • * and in any cause the court may, in 
its discretion, during the examination of a witness 
exclude any and all other witnesses in the cause." 
It should be noted that the exclusion is discretionary 
with the court, as to "any and all witnesses." In State v. 
Bonza. 72 Utah 177, 269 Pac. 480 (1928), the court had an 
issue similar to the instant one except the trial judge, after 
allowing the public to hear part of the prosecutrix's testi-
mony, excluded all persons for the remainder of the trial. 
The Supreme Court, of course, reversed, but in doing so 
noted: 
"* * * If, as was held in the case of State 
v. Callahan, supra, it was necessary to temporarily 
exclude spectators from the courtroom so that the 
trial could proceed, and the order of exclusion went 
no further, we would not be disposed to hold such 
an order error. * * *" 
Thus the court relying on State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 
63. 110 N. W. 342, indicated that a temporary exclusion of 
all spectators would not be error. In the instant case, it 
was only witnesses, not the public who were temporarily 
excused. In the Bonza case, the court found also that the 
exclusion of witnesses. even though one who might have 
been a \vitness was allowed to remain, was not error. The 
Utah authority would, therefore, seem to indicate no claim 
of prejudice could be made in the instant case. 
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In State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P. 2d 973 (1947), 
the court was faced with a situation where witnesses were 
excluded, but the prosecutrix had not been. In finding no 
prejudice, the court commented: 
''Appellant also claims prejudice by reason of 
the fact that the court invoked the exclusion rule, 
but permitted the prosecutrix to remain in the 
courtroom during the trial when she was not testi-
fying as a witness. Appellant objected to her pres-
ence, but the court ruled that she might remain to 
consult with the district attorney. Inasmuch as the 
prosecutrix was the complaining witness and had 
occasion to be available at all times to advise the 
district attorney as to facts, and for the further 
reason that she was the first witness called to tes-
tify, and that by way of rebuttal she merely cate-
gorically denied certain testimony of defense wit-
nesses. the court did not abuse its discretion, and no 
prejudice resulted." 
In State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P. 2d 1110 (1936) .. 
this court held it was not improper to exclude part of the 
public and also to exclude witnesses, even where one wit-
ness remained in the courtroom. 
In State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88 P. 2d 461 
(1939), the terms of what is now 78-7-4, U. C. A. 1953, 
were considered. The court held the right to exclude all 
persons as set out in the first part of the statute must be 
limited to civil trials, but that the discretionary power to 
exclude witnesses was proper in a criminal case. The court 
expressly noted that the exclusion of witnesses only "avoids 
any constitutional conflict." 
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The instant case does not involve a broad exclusionary 
order. or even a temporary order excluding the public. The 
exclusion was only some of the witnesses, for a period only 
during the prosecution's argument, which actually would 
be helpful to the defense since prosecution witnesses would 
not have thPir recollection refreshed by the prosecutor's 
opening statement. This is certainly not what was con-
demned in State v. Jo·rdan, 57 Utah 612, 196 Pac. 565 
( 1921) and State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177. 269 Pac. 480 
( 1928) . The court has relied on a statement in I Cooley. 
Constitutional Limitations, p. 64 7, as to what is encom-
passed by a public trial. It should be noted that it is therein 
stated that the purpose of the proviso or rule is to allow 
a ''reasonable proportion of the public to attend." In the 
instant case there was a reasonable proportion of the public 
present at all times. The right to a public trial has limita-
tions; thus Moreland, Modern Criminal Procedure, ( 1959), 
p. 261 notes : 
"The public trial concept, however, while firmly 
engrained in our common law and in the federal 
and most state constitutions, has never been viewed 
as imposing a rigid, inflexible straitjacket on the 
courts. It has uniformly been held to be subject to 
the inherent power of the court to preserve order 
and decorum in the courtroom and generally to 
further the judicial administration of criminal jus-
tice. But this language is general. More specific-
ally, it has been held that the court may limit the 
number of spectators in the interest of health and 
sanitation or in order to prevent overcrowding or 
disorder. It has also been recognized that the court 
may temporarily exclude spectators where necessary 
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to enable an immature or emotionally disturbed wit-
ness to testify. In other words, there is an author-
ity residing in the court to permit something less 
than a 'public trial' under certain circumstances." 
See also Note, 49 Columbia L. Rev. 110, 111 (1949); 6 Wig-
more, Evidence, Sec. 1834. 
Finally, the appellant, 1n the last part of his brief, 
makes objection to the necessity of having to object before 
the jury to the prosecution's motion for exclusion. Every 
objection, not relating to evidence that the jury should not 
hear, is properly made in open court. In the instant case 
it could as easily help accused as hinder him by showing 
the jury that he had nothing to hide, and preferred a "pub-
lic judgment." In People v. Gregory, 8 Cal. App. 738, 97 
Pac. 912 (1908), the prosecution moved for exclusion, de-
fendant objected and the court denied exclusion, noting he 
would but for his lack of power.1 On appeal the defendant, 
who was convicted of a lascivious act with his own daugh-
ter, contended the judge's statement and the necessity of 
objecting to be error. The court found no error, noting: 
"* * * The objection and exception to the 
court's statement upon that ground cannot be of 
any avail to the defendant. The court did not order 
the spectators to leave and remain from the court-
room during the trial, but explicitly declared that 
it had no power to do so. When the spectators with-
drew from the room they certainly must have done 
so with a full understanding. from the remarks of 
the court, that they were not compelled under the 
law or the ruling of the court to retire. Whether 
tit should be noted here that the trial judge correctly ruled he could 
not exclude spectators because of the Constitution. 
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they did or not, it is very plain that an order ex-
cluding spectators was not made by the court. and 
that, if the defendant was deprived of the high con-
stitutional privilege of having the public listen to 
the witnesses detail facts and circumstances tending 
to prove against him the commission of acts, the 
offensive and noxious odors from which would drive 
a polecat into bankruptcy, it was due less to the 
remarks of the court than to the commendable sense 
of decency with which the citizens of Red Bluff 
comported themselves with reference to the trial." 
The above case is almost on all fours with this one. No 
error can be claimed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN REJECTING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR MISTRIAL AS TO OFFICER DYER'S 
TESTIMONY. 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
not granting a mistrial because of statements made by Offi-
cer Dyer, while being cross-examined by appellant's coun-
sel. Just \vhat particular facet of Officer Dyer's testimony 
is found objectionable is not pinpointed: however, a com-
plete review of the testimony will show no impropriety or 
prejudice. 
At the time of the prosecution's opening statement the 
following was said, (R. 24) : 
"* * * You know that this case, as well as 
the defendant's case will be presented to you through 
witnesses and actually only evidence is to be con-
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sidered by you, not what I say in my opening state-
ment or what Mr. Bingham may say, if he makes 
one. 
"Really, our only purpose in making an opening 
statement is, we hope perhaps that we will enable 
you to better follow the evidence as presented here 
today. Now, the state expects to call at this time 
about four witnesses. Frankly, there will be two 
primary witnesses and the other witnesses will be 
very. very brief." 
The two primary witnesses referred to were the prosecutrix 
and the doctor. It "vas obvious that the latter person's tes-
timony was that 'vhich convinced the jury, since after re-
tiring they requested his testimony be reread, which was 
done. and thereafter a verdict of guilty was returned. 
Officer Dyer was one of the "brief" witnesses. With 
reference to his expected testimony it was said during op-
ening argument, (R. 29) : 
"* * * We will call Officer Dyer who will 
briefly tell you that when this defendant was 
charged with the crime of rape and was advised 
that he was charged with the crime of rape, that 
instead of the defendant turning and denying it as 
a father would-. 
"MR. BINGHAM: (Interposing) I object to 
this form of testimony. It is highly argumentative. 
He is not telling what the evidence will be. He is 
arguing the impact and effect of it. 
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
"MR. NEWEY: Pardon me, Your Honor. We 
will show when this defendant is advised and 
charged with the crime of rape he turned to the 
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officer and said, 'you can't make it a lesser charge, 
something like that, fondling or that?' 
''MR. BINGHAM: Like what? 
"~IR. NEWEY: Fondling, I believe that was 
the word. It may have been a little different. 
"Officer Dyer will testify as to exactly what 
the defendant said, and he will testify that this de-
fendant did not deny it, but merely asked Tim, 'can't 
you make it a reduced charge?' " 
Thereafter, following the testimony of the prosecutrix 
and prior to the testimony of Doctor Rich, Officer Dyer 
was called. He had not been present during the prosecu-
tion's opening argument. He testified that he was an offi-
cer with the Youth Bureau of the Ogden City Police De-
partment ( R. 93), and that at the time of booking the fol-
lowing occurred. ( R. 95) : 
"A. The jailer asked me what I wanted him 
booked for, and I told the jailer, for the charge of 
rape. and then Larry Myers made a statement to 
me. He said, 'Officer Dyer, can't you make that a 
lesser charge, like molesting instead of rape.'" 
Thus, his testimony was essentially the same as the prose-
cutor had said it would be. The testimony of Officer Dyer 
was to an express admission of the appellant, against ap-
pellant's interest, at the time of booking. 
On cross-examination the defense counsel sought to 
show that the accused had denied the charge of rape during 
the time he was 'vith Officer Dyer.2 The following oc-
curred, (R. 96) : 
2This scope of cross-examination exceeded the time and subject of direct. 
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"Q. Were you present here in court when Mr. 
Newey gave his opening statement to the jury? 
"A. No, I was barred from the courtroom. 
''Q. I see. Now, is it true that Mr. Myers 
didn't deny the charge of rape? 
"A. What was this again? 
"Q. Did Mr. Myers deny to you that he was 
guilty of rape; yes, or no? 
"A. I don't get your question. Would you re-
peat it again? 
"Q. When a man is arrested and charged with 
a crime, the officer asks him if he is guilty of this 
thing. You do this, don't you? 
"A. On this case or other cases? 
"Q. On any case, when you arrest a man of 
a crime. you ask him if he is guilty or innocent, 
don't you. Did you do it or didn't you? 
"A. No, we don't ask a fellow if he is guilty 
or innocent. no. 
"Q. Do you mean to tell me if I got arrested 
for a charge like this you wouldn't ask me if I did 
it? 
"A. I didn't ask him if he did it. 
"Q. Is it your testimony under oath that you 
didn't ask Larry Myers if he committed this of-
fense or not? 
"A. Thats right, I didn't ask him that. 
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"Q. Is it your testimony that that is standard 
police procedure not to ask an accused person if he 
did the offense that he is charged with? 
"A. Now, state that question again, please, I 
don't get what the question is. 
"Q. Is it my understanding that it is standard 
police procedure when you arrest a person not to 
ask him whether he has done the offense that he 
is charged with? 
''A. It all depends on whether you have other 
cases with this person or not. We know him pretty 
well. 
"Q. Thank you, Sir. 
"A. y . es, s1r. 
"Q. Your Honor, I have a matter to be brought 
up in the absence of the jury at this time. 
''THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
"Q. What has Mr. Myers been guilty of? 
Name one thing. I don't know what his complete 
record is. 
''Q. What has he been guilty of? 
''A. I don't know what his complete record is. 
"Q. N arne me anything, anything that this 
man is guilty of, you name me one thing. 
"A. (No response.) 
"Q. You have had experience with this man, 
you know him. What has he been guilty of? You've 
told the jury that. 
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"A. (No response.) 
"Q. Now, you tell the jury why you said that. 
"A. You asked me. 
"Q. I didn't ask you. 
"A. You did, you asked me why. 
"A. All right, I'll ask you this. You said the 
reason why you didn't ask Mr. Myers why he was 
guilty or innocent of raping his ten year old daugh-
ter is because you had experience with him in the 
past. Is that right? 
"A. Yes, sir; that is right. 
"Q. Therefore. you knew that he wouldn't an-
swer you. Is that right? 
"A. y . es, s1r. 
"Q. So you didn't bother to ask him. Right? 
"A. Yes. sir; that is right. 
''Q. And he never denied it, is that right. 
"A. Let's see. Wait a minute now. We had 
a conversation down in my office. Of course I 
haven't been asked all about the conversation 
though. 
"Q. He never denied it, right? The charge 
of rape, he never denied it, right? 
"A. Yes, he did, down in my office. 
"Q. And strongly and violently, didn't he? 
"A. Yes, I believe he did. 
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"Q. So violently that he threatened to punch 
you, didn't he? 
"A. No, he never threatened to punch me. 
"Q. Did he deny it as violently as you have 
ever seen a man deny a charge, in your opinion? 
"A. No, it wasn't that violent. 
"Q. All right, then he did deny his guilt, 
didn't he. Officer Dyer? 
"A. Yes, sir; down in my office. 
''Q. Well. did you ask him? 
"A. No, I didn't. 
"Q. On, he just did it on his own? 
"A. No, I just told him he was arrested for 
the charge of rape. 
"Q. What did he say? 
"A. I don't know the exact words. 
"THE COURT: Answer as near as you can 
what he said. 
"A. Well, I told him that his daughter Sherry 
had stated that he had committed sex relations with 
her and that I was placing him under arrest for 
this charge of rape on the statement that his daugh-
ter had made the night before, which was on Sun-
day night, and he said, 'well, I didn't rape her.' He 
said, 'I don't know anything about it.' " 
Apparently counsel for the appellant had misconstrued 
what the prosecution was going to show by way of evidence, 
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that of an admission against interest, rather than a failure 
to deny guilt. This might have been due to some ambiguity 
in the opening statement, but it was clear, after the evidence 
was presented, in just what area the prosecution had pre-
sented testimony and thus limited its case. Thereafter, de-
fense counsel entered into a new area, and having asked 
questions of the officer in such area, he cannot complain of 
the answers received. The officer did not mention any 
previous crimes, but merely that he knew the appellant 
''pretty well" and. therefore, would not bother to ask the 
accused whether he was guilty or not. This evidence, when 
viewed in the light that it was presented by the defense, 
while exceeding the scope of direct, was not incriminatory 
or informative of other criminal activity of the accused, 
was on a relatively minor point of evidence, was diluted by 
the fact, that on cross-examination the officer admitted 
the accused protested his guilt. Finally, the statement did 
not appear to weigh in the jury's mind. Additively, no 
basis for a claim of prejudice is manifest. 
No claim of prejudice can be sustained from the am-
biguity of the prosecution's opening statement, since the 
testimony of Officer Dyer was in substance just as the 
prosecution said it would be. Even if it were slightly dif-
ferent, this is no basis for error, since it is well settled 
that: 
"* * * the fact that the prosecuting attor-
ney stated more than he is able to prove, is not 
prejudicial error provided he makes such statement 
in good faith. * * *" 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice. 4th Ed., p. 466. 
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See State v. Broadhurst, 184 Ore. 178. 196 P. 2d 407; 
State v. Welsh, 138 Kan. 379, 26 P. 2d 592 (1933); People 
v. Chalmers, 5 Utah 201, 14 Pac. 131 ( 1887). 
Nor can error be claimed from the innocuous state-
ment that the appellant was well known to Officer Dyer. 
First, because the answer was to a question posed by coun-
sel for appellant, and, secondly, nothing connecting the 
accused with a crime was stated, nor did the officer indi-
cate any such knowledge. In Cahill v. People, 111 Colo. 
173, 138 P. 2d 936 ( 1943), a much more serious, but similar 
remark was held not to constitute reversible error. The 
witness for the prosecution in a larceny case. being cross-
examined as to what had happened to some previously miss-
ing cattle, stated that they were stolen and that a confes-
sion from the men who stole them had been given. inferring 
the guilt of the defendant. Defense counsel immediately 
moved to strike and claimed prejudicial error. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court noted that the witness had testified 
that she had no real knowledge of any theft and concluded 
that no prejudicial error occurred: 
"It is said reversible error arose from the fail-
ure of the court to sustain the motion to strike. The 
answer to which the motion was directed, which 
gave the witness' view of the effect of the evidence 
already before the jury, did no more than accentu-
ate, as she consistently admitted, that she had no 
personal knowledge of the theft. Considering her 
previous admissions in this respect and the form 
of the question, it cannot be considered that counsel 
was surprised by the answer or that the cause of 
defendant was injured in any degree thereby." 
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See also People v. Zammora, 66 C. A. 2d 166, 152 P. 
2d 180 (reference to accused as being in a "gang"); People 
V. Mason, 65 C. A. 2d 5, 149 P. 2d 742 (inference of prosti-
tution); State v. Cofer, 73 Ida. 181, 249 P. 2d 197 (infer-
ence of immorality). 
Clearly, where there was actual evidence of the de-
fendant having many wives (R. 80), and living with other 
women, a statement that he was "known" by the youth offi-
cer is not error. To hold otherwise would make a mountain 
of a molehill and and deny to people essential justice. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
NOTING FOR THE RECORD WHAT WAS OB-
VIOUS TO THE JURY AND A MATTER OF 
VISIBLE FACT AND WHICH WAS INFORM-
ATIVE OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING DURING 
TRIAL. 
The appellant contends it was error for the trial court. 
during the course of the cross-examination of the prose-
cutrix, when the defense asked the prosecutrix why she 
was looking at her aunt before answering each question. to 
make the following comment, (R. 75) : 
"THE COURT: The record may show that 
counsel stands between Aunt Freda and the wit-
ness." 
This was merely a statement for the record of what was 
obvious to all who were in court, but would not be obvious 
to an appellate court. It could have two possible adverse 
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inferences. First, that the reason Sherry was looking at 
her aunt was because her aunt was in direct view when 
she was replying to counsel; secondly, that counsel would 
block the vie\V to some extent. A more innocuous state-
ment could hardly be imagined. No objection was made 
to the court's action, so that it is arguable that the matter 
has not been preserved for appeal. State v. Kerns, 50 N. D. 
927, 198 N. W. 698. Even so, the incident was not im-
proper. In Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 
236, it is noted: 
"The trial court has inherent power to do every-
thing reasonably necessary for the administration 
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. It is 
his duty to so supervise and regulate the course of 
a trial that the truth shall be revealed in so far as 
it may be within the established rules of evidence." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Certainly, where the judge has a right to interrogate a wit. 
ness, he would also have a right to point out what is visible 
for all. but would be silent in the record. It is difficult to 
see how such a statement caused any prejudice. 
Additionally, it is asserted that the trial court com-
mitted error. after a side bar conference, when he noted 
for the record what had transpired at that conference, (R. 
135): 
"THE COURT: The record may show there 
has been an injection which might tend to bear upon 
this woman's mental capacity and the court has 
ruled that you may ask. You may proceed." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
The court did not comment on its feelings of guilt or 
innocence, or the evidence to be presented, but merely 
allowed the prosecution to go forward with its evidence. 
An additional notation for the record, out of the presence 
of the jury, was made, reflecting, (R. 200) : 
"THE COURT: Put in your evidence tomor-
row of what your information is. In view of the 
representation made to me at the bench plus the 
misconduct of this particular witness during the 
trial, I think it is all right to let him ask it." 
All the trial judge previously did was note for the record 
the fact that the prosecution had relevant evidence on the 
credibility of one defense witness, and that it was proper 
for him to go forward with his proof. Thereafter, psychi-
atric testimony was presented by two doctors to the effect 
that at the times relevant to the witness's testimony, she 
had been under psychiatric care. The witness herself ad-
,mitted psychiatric treatment for drugs. Clearly therefore, 
there was nothing improper in the trial judge merely not-
ing for the record what had occurred.3 
Even if there was impropriety, subsequent testimony 
of record did more to destroy the witness than what the 
trial judge may have done. Consequently. no error can be 
claimed. State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 356, 188 P. 2d 449; 
-State v. Dodge. 12 U. 2d 293, 365 P. 2d 798 (1961); State 
v. Neal, 1 U. 2d 122, 127, 262 P. 2d 756. 
Finally, it must be noted that the court did not com· 
menton the evidence, indicate any belief as to the guilt of 
aNotably the prosecution was overly cautious and afforded the witness 
the physician-patient privilege in a criminal case where none exists-
78-24-8, ~u. c. A. 1953. 
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the accused, or afford the jury any basis to conclude he 
felt the appellant guilty. No objection was made to the 
court's statements. Few more unmeritorious claims have 
been pressed before appellate tribunals than those asser-
tions advanced on this point by the appellant. 
POINT IV. 
THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT AP-
PELLANT WAS AFFORDED A FAIR TRIAL 
AND THAT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE WAS 
DONE. 
The appellant claims cumulative error, but as can be 
seen, no errors have in fact been demonstrated. Such 
an argument may be meritorious where a series of errors 
are admitted, the totality of which would induce a jury 
to unjustly convict, State v. St. Clair, 3 U. 2d 230, 282 P. 
2d 323 ( 1955). In the instant case however, a complete ex-
amination of the record reveals a superabundance of cau-
tion on behalf of both the judge and the prosecution, to the 
extent of seriously prejudicing the case. the prosecution 
could present. The essence of the proper application of 
criminal law is the affirmative answer to the question: 
\Vas essential justice done? In this instance, it clearly was 
afforded the appellant. Consequently there is no merit to 
the contention of cumulative error. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was convicted of a despicable crime, but 
what is more important, his conviction was based upon 
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overwhelming. substantial, credible evidence of guilt. The 
jury obviously weighed the evidence thoroughly and con-
cluded the appellant's guilt was conclusively proved beyond 
any reasonable doubt. The record in the instant case sup-
ports that contention, but in addition, shows a conscien-
tious concern of both the prosecution and the court for the 
accused's rights, and for fair play in the face of a deter-
mined and capable defense. To reverse the instant case 
would serve neither the ends of justice nor the advance-
ment of the law, but rather, would promote injustice, de-
stroy respect to the courts, and depreciate the individual 
right of a citizen to be free of injury, without just cause, 
to his body and person. Jeremy Bentham, the incisive 
English legal reformist, once commented that ''the law was 
an ass". He did so attacking the theory of jurisprudence 
then being proffered in England - technical and strict 
adherence to legal formalism. Bentham concluded this 
could be a two-edged sword. An overly technical applica-
tion of the law could work both ways; it could unjustifiedly 
acquit or unjustifiedly convict. He advocated reform, but 
phrased it in terms of essential justice. Such was done in 
the instant case. 
This court, in pursuit of that end, must affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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